El Presidente Nicolás Maduro durante un evento en el Palacio de Miraflores

Trump, Venezuela and the Edge of Intervention: Between Regime Change and Democratic Reconstruction

After nearly three decades of chavismo, an ideology that began as a populist project and degenerated into an authoritarian regime intertwined with narcotrafficking. Venezuela stands exhausted and unstable, facing what appears to be one of the most critical moments in its modern history. With roughly 20% of U.S. naval power deployed in the Caribbean and pointed directly toward Venezuelan territory. Now, the country seems to be on the verge of a U.S. military intervention whose scale, motives, and duration could determine whether a future post-Maduro government emerges with legitimacy and strength.

Despite reports suggesting a potential slowdown in Washington, the level of military mobilization makes it increasingly unlikely that Trump can retreat without immense political and symbolic costs. To be labeled indecisive or cowardly is something a figure as image-conscious and combative as Trump would hardly tolerate. With that in mind, a series of essential questions emerges: What condition is Venezuela in? What strategic objective might Trump be pursuing by escalating military pressure? And which post-intervention scenario would avoid eroding the legitimacy of a new Venezuelan government, as occurred with Panama’s Guillermo Endara after the 1989 invasion?

Venezuela’s internal situation

Venezuela’s internal situation has reached a dead end. Fourteen years of Hugo Chávez and twelve of Nicolás Maduro, marked by manipulated reelections in 2019 and 2024, have left the political opposition cornered. Every strategy attempted over two decades has failed. Mass protests, international pressure, sanctioned-backed negotiations, external mediation, sanctions, and parallel government experiments such as the Guaidó mandate. Maduro refused to acknowledge the opposition’s overwhelming victory in the July 2024 election. This despite evidence that over 70% of voting records supported María Corina Machado’s win. This led to opposition being crushed through repression, legal maneuvering, and insufficient global pressure. Today, Machado is in hiding, Edmundo González is in exile, and the opposition has little capacity to force a transition without U.S. intervention.

US intentions

This context makes Washington’s intentions crucial. For now, Trump has deployed massive military assets near Venezuela’s coast. These were ordered to strike against drug-trafficking vessels since September, and repeatedly stated that “all options remain on the table.” These moves seem designed to apply psychological pressure on Maduro, the armed forces, and the regime’s foreign partners including Russia, China, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. But by committing such overwhelming force, Trump appears to have crossed a threshold: every day without Maduro’s removal now weakens Washington’s hand and emboldens Caracas.

Given the trajectory, an American incursion seems increasingly plausible. The spectrum of military options ranges from air and missile strikes against high-value targets to a full-scale invasion combining airpower and ground forces. The first option would focus on decapitating Maduro’s inner circle and neutralizing strategic assets, leaving Venezuelans to reclaim institutions and streets. A second option, likely if the stated mission becomes “restoring democracy”, would require a longer-term troop presence to eliminate resistance, stabilize territory, install a transitional government, and supervise new elections.

Central question for the future of Venezuela’s autonomy

At the center of these scenarios lies the critical question. Would Washington support a genuinely strong Venezuelan leadership capable of independently rebuilding institutions, or would it seek to shape Venezuela’s post-conflict political order according to American interests? The difference is decisive. If the Trump administration respects María Corina Machado’s leadership and gives her space to direct reconstruction, Venezuela could begin a difficult but authentic path toward restoring democratic legitimacy. But if the U.S. attempts to micromanage the transition, limiting Machado’s autonomy or imposing decisions from above, it risks repeating the mistake made in Panama, where swearing in Endara on a U.S. base fatally weakened his legitimacy from the start.

The coming months will clarify whether the crisis culminates in a high-scale intervention, whether such an operation is justified as a counter-narcotics mission or as a regime-change-and-democratic-restoration effort, and whether Trump is willing to respect Venezuelan leadership in the process. For now, uncertainty prevails.  The timeline, objectives, and political aftermath of a possible intervention remain opaque, as does the extent to which Washington will allow Venezuelans, rather than foreign hands, to shape the country’s return to democracy.

Reference

Olmos, G. (2025, November 23). Venezuela. Substack. https://substack.com/inbox/post/179779986?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true