The balance of power between the United States and China is being reshaped by a weakening of Washington’s negotiating position with Xi Jinping, largely due to deteriorating relations with longstanding allies. Although the United States still possesses significant leverage over Beijing through sanctions, access to advanced technologies, and the influence of its consumer market, much of its historical strength came from the ability to coordinate pressure alongside trusted partners. As those alliances become strained, the effectiveness of that leverage is increasingly limited.
Tensions with allies have intensified amid growing uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to multilateral institutions and longstanding partnerships. Trade disputes, criticism of NATO, and a broader retreat from cooperative international frameworks have encouraged many countries to pursue more independent strategies toward China. While Washington devoted attention to geopolitical flashpoints such as Iran, Greenland and Venezuela, Beijing expanded its diplomatic and economic outreach, strengthening ties with countries that had traditionally aligned more closely with the United States. South Korea, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany all deepened commercial or strategic cooperation with China through new agreements in trade, technology, energy and investment.
This situation exposes an important contradiction in contemporary US foreign policy. A strategy centered on unilateral action and “America First” priorities may ultimately undermine the very influence it seeks to protect. The weakening of allied cohesion reduces Washington’s capacity to negotiate from a position of collective strength, creating opportunities for Beijing to benefit from fragmentation among Western partners. China appears increasingly able to pursue a divide-and-deal strategy, engaging countries individually while facing fewer coordinated constraints on its behavior. The implications extend beyond diplomacy, raising concerns about how fractured alliances can shift geopolitical power and reduce collective responses to shared vulnerabilities.
At the same time, signs of renewed cooperation suggest that the erosion of alliances is not irreversible. New initiatives focused on semiconductors and critical minerals indicate a growing recognition that strategic dependencies on China are difficult to address alone. Programs such as Pax Silica and the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) seek to strengthen supply chains and reduce technological and material vulnerabilities through coordinated efforts among partner nations. Although their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain, these initiatives reflect an acknowledgment that unilateralism may weaken American influence in areas where collective bargaining is more effective.
The same logic applies to transnational issues such as fentanyl trafficking, where diplomatic pressure on China has shown some progress but may prove insufficient without broader international cooperation. Efforts to address synthetic drug supply chains, like trade negotiations involving North America, reveal how policy success increasingly depends on consultation and sustained partnerships rather than coercive measures alone.
A broader geopolitical dilemma emerges from these developments. If the United States continues weakening relationships with its allies, China will likely deepen an approach that capitalizes on division and bilateral bargaining. Yet even amid uncertainty surrounding American leadership, allied countries may still find incentives to establish common red lines toward Beijing independently. In a prolonged period of US–China rivalry, cooperation among partners appears less like a diplomatic preference and more like a necessary condition for preserving influence and limiting strategic vulnerabilities in an increasingly fragmented international order.
Reference: Chatham House. (2026, May 12). Trump’s treatment of US allies has weakened his negotiating position with Xi. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/trumps-treatment-us-allies-has-weakened-his-negotiating-position-xi